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CHAPTER TEN 
PURSUING PROSPERITY, 1953-1961 
 
In January 1953, Dwight Eisenhower became the leader of an American 
economy that faced three major challenges.  One stemmed from a postwar 
settlement that had laid the foundation for a second globalization of the world 
economy.  The first, British-led globalization of the late nineteenth century had 
been destroyed long ago by the First World War and the retreat in the 1920s and 
1930s to nationalism, then to autarky, and finally to war again.  Now the United 
States had replaced Britain as the informal overseer of the global movement, but it 
was still not at all clear in 1953 that America would be up to this task.  There were 
serious internal struggles over trade policy and international competition, struggles 
that frequently tied Congress in knots and made it difficult to frame coherent 
policies.547   
Another closely related challenge involved America’s capacity to generate 
the productivity gains and basic innovations that had powered the nation’s growth 
since the nineteenth century.548  Many learned analysts thought that the second 




era, they concluded, would no longer provide America with new investment 
opportunities or the country’s consumers with the new goods and services they had 
come to expect.  There was serious discussion in the late forties and early fifties of 
stagnation or even worse, stagflation, a devastating combination of slow growth 
and high inflation.549 
The third problem was easier to understand but still difficult to solve.  It 
stemmed from a combination of accumulated federal obligations, the ongoing 
expenditures for the war in Korea, and the added expenses of a major military 
buildup.  The 1953 deficit would be $6.5 billion – an amount that would foster 
inflation if Congress ended the Korean War program of price controls.550    
These challenges had global as well as national implications.  Since 1945, the 
United States had been the bulwark for the capitalist nations arrayed against the 
Soviet Union and its allies and client states.  The United States was also providing 
essential support for the new array of international institutions – the United 
Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank – designed to 
prevent the kind of economic nationalism and beggar-thy-neighbor autarky that 
had led the world toward war in the 1930s.  Meanwhile, America had pumped 
substantial Marshall Plan subsidies into the effort to spur western Europe’s postwar 




In the new President’s mind, the links between these international programs, 
the nation’s foreign policy, and the success of its domestic economy were crucial 
and self-evident.  He fully understood that one of his most important tasks was to 
guide the world’s largest industrial economy by working with Congress to craft 
policies that would help to keep business profitable, hold down unemployment, 
control inflation, and promote growth.  These were awesome goals.  To some 
considerable extent, they were conflicting goals.552  They were a formidable 
challenge to the new administration and its leader.  
Especially so because nothing in Eisenhower’s long Army career had 
prepared him for this new role.  In the aftermath of World War I, he had developed 
an economic mobilization plan for the War Department, but his understanding of 
and interest in America’s very large, very complex economy was shallow.  He 
sought and received advice about industry from investors like Bernard Baruch.  
But he appears not to have developed any particularly salient ideas that would help 
him in 1953.  Even during the Great Depression of the 1930s he had given little 
thought to what made America’s capitalist system tick – or not tick. 
Many of his experiences as a professional soldier were, however, relevant to 
his tasks in the White House.  He had learned how important it was to operate 
within the given political context and to draw upon the best professional expertise 




easy it is to get into economic trouble and how important it was to avoid getting 
trapped in that way.  Ike knew that he would have to build an effective team and 
provide them and the nation with an appropriate vision of America’s past, present, 
and future.  In the realm of economic policy, he was not entirely prepared to do all 
that in 1953.  As President, he was in effect sent back to school, and his 
performance would provide a good test of his ability to learn on the job and give 
effective leadership to his administration.   
                                                                                                               
A Collage of Economic Ideas 
 While lacking formal training or knowledge of the economy, his mind was 
filled – as most of ours are—with random economic ideas.554  Many of these traces 
of thought were rooted in his personal experiences.  Some of the ideas had been 
gathered long ago when he was growing up in Abilene, Kansas, when he was far 
more interested in football than finance.  His family -- as we have seen in previous 
chapters -- was poor and money was always tight.  Life near the railroad tracks was 
not easy, and Ike and his brothers were familiar with hand-me-down clothing.  It 
may sound quaint or even humorous to you, but my sense is that it was not easy or 
fun when one of the younger brothers had to wear a pair of women’s second-hand 
shoes to school.  All of that was distant by 1953, but Ike’s early life left him 




incomes were low and relatively fixed.  There were many Americans who had 
shared these experiences in the 1930s. 
 His own career and those of his brothers convinced Eisenhower that even the 
poorest American could better his income and status if he got an education and 
worked hard.  The best road to progress and upward mobility for white Kansans of 
that era was through the professions. Ike’s father had worked hard.  But lacking the 
right kind of education and career, he was stuck for much of his life in the 
American Nightmare, a detour on the highway of American Dreams.  David could 
barely support his family and certainly could not help his sons pay to attend a 
college or university.  Later, long after Ike left Abilene, David completed his 
degree through a mail-order school and at last made it into a white-collar job.  But 
finishing his education was an afterthought to a long career spent performing the 
kind of labor that garnered little respect and even less income in an advanced, 
urban society.   
Ike’s older brother Edgar had charted a far better course at the University of 
Michigan and in the legal profession.  He had quickly achieved the material 
success and status that had eluded their father.  Edgar was not the only brother in 
the Eisenhower household who had successfully scaled the capitalist ladder.  To 




their way up in a society that seemed happy to reward the right mixture of 
intelligence, self-discipline, and ambition.    
 After young Dwight had launched his military career, he had also learned 
something about the perils of debt.  Like much of the working class and many 
middle-class Americans, Eisenhower periodically wanted to buy more than he 
could afford.555  He had suffered an embarrassing episode when he did not have 
enough cash to buy the uniforms he needed to serve in his first post.  Later, his 
career was endangered when he misled the Army about expenses for a son who 
was not then living with him.  He emerged from these experiences with a visceral 
opposition to debt.  In that sense, he resembled the average American in the 1950s 
but was an anomaly in a Republican Party that included many businessmen and 
women who built their fortunes by using debt successfully.   
     
Post-Graduate Training in Economic Policy 
To help Ike translate his core ideas into specific economic policies, his team 
of shadow supporters for the presidency had begun introducing him to the major 
economic issues facing the United States.  They started this informal course of 
post-graduate training long before he had actually announced his decision to run 
for office.  Some of the economic grooming had been informal:  it popped up in the 




or New York Herald Tribune publisher William E. Robinson.  It arose in his 
frequent dealings at Columbia University with business leaders like Thomas 
Watson of IBM.556  The more formal phase of his economic education was initially 
handled by George A. Sloan, a director at the United States Steel Corporation. 
Sloan’s approach was gentle.  It began at a dinner with Ike, Mamie, and Mr. and 
Mrs. Sloan in 1950.557  Then, Sloan visited Ike in Paris and tried to nudge him 
toward a run at the presidency.  Sloan also reported on the possibility of a major 
economic downturn and provoked the following response from the General: 
“When people are out of work, bewildered, and see their families enduring 
privation, they instinctively turn to the greatest temporal force of which they 
know—the government—for relief.  In doing so, it is easy enough to forget that all 
powers of government must always be carefully and intelligently limited or it is 
certain to become the master of the people who have set it up.  In other words, 
catastrophes of the kind we are now describing become the occasion for weaving 
into governmental organization, procedures, and functions a net in which is caught 
an increasing portion of the individual political and economic liberty which is the 
basic characteristic of our system.”558 
Would Eisenhower allow the people to sink or swim?  No.  “These things 
could be thought about in advance—they could be studied and the intellectual 




help he needed but without permanent damage to the essentials of representative 
government.”559  Obviously, the Great Depression of the 1930s and the New Deal 
programs prior to World War II were front and center in Ike’s mind. 
Although at that time he was preoccupied with the situation in Europe, 
Eisenhower said he was grateful for Sloan’s report “on the American scene.”  He 
asked for additional “interesting condensed reports…” There was little chance that 
Sloan would not respond positively to that request, as he was now deeply engaged 
in the process of easing Ike into the presidential campaign.  Further reports 
followed from those Eisenhower referred to as “my friends.”560  They were of 
course much more than that.  They pressured Eisenhower to speak more 
specifically to “the issues,” rather than the principles the General was 
expounding.561  On matters of national security in the Cold War, Eisenhower had 
in mind both a general statement of strategy and specific measures to implement 
that strategy.562  But he left domestic policy more abstract than Sloan and his 
colleagues felt would best serve the purposes of the fast-approaching political 
campaign.  But as it turned out, Ike was able to win both the nomination and the 
ensuing campaign without committing himself to a specific set of economic 
policies.  That quickly changed, however, after he won his sweeping victory in the 





Getting Up To Speed 
 In preparation for that momentous transition, the President-Elect quickly put 
together a team.  Because he lacked a solid background in domestic policy, Ike’s 
choices for his economic advisors were extremely important.  His Secretary of the 
Treasury, George M. Humphrey, who came out of Ohio and the Taft wing of the 
Republican Party, brought good business sense to the table and a tendency to focus 
very tightly on taxes.  Similar input with a similar tilt came from Budget Director 
Joseph M. Dodge and from Gabriel Hauge, who was the President’s Special 
Assistant for Economic Affairs.  Economist Arthur F. Burns, the new head of the 
Council of Economic Advisors, played a different role.  He put the President in 
touch with the work being done at the National Bureau of Economic Research and 
with the Keynesian economics that had swept into America following World War 
II.  It was a measure of Eisenhower’s respect for Burns and also of the President’s 
weak background in economics that he allowed Burns to select the other two 
members of the Council.563 
 Together, this team helped the President frame the specific policies set forth 
in his first State of the Union message to Congress (February 2, 1953).  The 
address was important because it placed before the legislature, the nation, and all 
those foreign observers attuned to developments in the United States an economic 




adjustments, Eisenhower would promote the same basic programs in his second 
term.  Four central themes emerged: first, the need to achieve economic growth 
through greater efficiency in both the public and the private sectors; second, the 
closely related need to promote innovation, the “creative initiative in our 
economy.”  Along with the “economic health and strength” created by achieving 
the first two aims would come “equality of opportunity,” buttressed by the 
“safeguards against the privations that too often come with unemployment, old 
age, illness, and accident” – that is, the economic security essential to life in “a 
complex industrial economy.” 
 Very soon, Eisenhower began to give specific form to this vision for 
America’s economic future.  The generalizations characteristic of all political 
campaigns gave way to very detailed policy proposals.  Economic growth, 
Eisenhower said, could be achieved in several very precise ways:  for starters, they 
needed to get rid of price controls, reduce the government’s debt, and balance the 
budget.564   By stabilizing the economy, his administration would be able to 
promote the innovations that would flow from “the free play of our people’s genius 
for individual initiative.”  The national effort to achieve efficiency would start with 
the federal government and ripple to the private sector:  “we are concerned with 
the encouragement of competitive enterprise and individual initiative precisely 




plan left Ike supporting the traditional antitrust policy and leaning hard against 
those pressing to cut taxes quickly and those who wanted to continue spending as 
usual.  On these bedrock issues, he had to be tough.  On taxes, for instance, there 
was at first hardly any room for the kind of compromises his conciliatory approach 
to leadership normally favored.      
 This program, he was certain, would not interfere with his administration’s 
efforts to see that Americans would also have the economic security they needed 
and the equity they deserved.  He thought that economic growth without a good 
measure of security could not be successful over the long-term in a democracy.  He 
was not a leveler – a reformer determined to eliminate inequality.  Like most 
Americans, he assumed that equality of opportunity would suffice to bring to the 
top those deserving strivers who – like his siblings – had worked their way up from 
the other side, the poor side, of the railroad tracks. 
 
Realities of Economic Growth 
 The first battleground was fiscal policy.  He initially had immense power to 
shape the legislative decisions on taxes and spending.  He knew it and he used that 
power with his own closest advisors and with the Republicans who controlled 
Congress.  He managed to hold taxes at the abnormally high level set for upper-




pressure in his own party on the tax issue, he noted in his diary:  “I believe that the 
American public wants security ahead of tax reduction and that while we can save 
prodigious sums in the Defense Department without materially hurting our 
security, we cannot safely, this year, knock out enough to warrant an immediate 
tax reduction….  [He feared] another deficit of extraordinary size… [that] would 
be most inflationary in its effect.”566  The end of the war in Korea and the adoption 
of a new defense strategy enabled Ike to nail down his most important economic 
accomplishment:  a balanced budget in 1956.  He achieved that objective while 
dealing with numerous issues that he considered sideshows to the nation’s main 
economic features. 
 One of those dangerous sideshows was provided by the volatile Senator 
Joseph McCarthy.  Ike had been badly burned in the campaign when he sacrificed 
his friendship with George Marshall in order to avoid a public spat with McCarthy.  
Now the President adopted a passive strategy for dealing with McCarthy’s wild, 
inaccurate charges that communist spies had infiltrated major American 
institutions and were threatening the republic.  McCarthy was a dangerous 
demagogue whose charges played on people’s fears about the Cold War struggle 
with the Soviet Union.  Refusing to bring more attention to McCarthy, Ike worked 
quietly, covertly, and effectively to undermine the Senator from Wisconsin.  By 




leadership they needed on this issue.  Ultimately, however, Eisenhower’s strategy 
was successful and McCarthy was defeated in 1954, leaving the President 
opportunity to concentrate on what he considered to be the vital issues before the 
nation.567       
He had much to do on these other fronts.  As if to punish the President for 
his fiscal accomplishments, the congressional elections in 1954 had left him 
burdened with a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives.  That called 
for additional compromises, but Eisenhower proved adept at working with 
Congress, even with liberal Democrats who had a more expansive attitude toward 
debt than Ike did.568  The reward for those necessary compromises and for the 
grinding effort to reduce federal expenditures came with another balanced budget 
in 1957.  Eisenhower would enjoy his third and last balanced budget in 1960, an 
accomplishment that was neither well understood nor appreciated during the 
presidential campaign that year when Vice President Richard Nixon ran against 
John Kennedy.   
To Eisenhower, however, these budgets were of vital importance:  they 
helped to create the relatively stable economic environment that he believed was 
the essential context for promoting secular economic growth.  They also gave the 
administration maneuvering room when it had to weather downturns in the 




a deeper and longer recession, and finally to a less challenging decline in 1960-
61.569   
With the assistance of a Federal Reserve Board that accepted Ike’s emphasis 
on preventing inflation, the administration survived these recession challenges with 
its basic strategy intact.  While Eisenhower formally respected the Fed’s 
autonomy, he worked closely with Chairman Martin to keep the government united 
and focused on controlling inflation first and then promoting balanced growth.570  
The most serious challenge to this policy was in 1957-1958, when unemployment 
reached 7.6% despite a 3% rate of inflation.  Still, the administration held the line. 
In peace, as in war, Eisenhower relentlessly sought the Middle Way through 
compromise and cooperation within his administration, within the government, and 
within the entire American society. 
 The President tried to promote efficiency in both the public and the private 
sectors.  Without changing the statutory missions of the federal agencies, he called 
for and received reduced budgets.571  This negative approach to increasing 
productivity by simply cutting an agency’s budget was not likely to yield good 
results over the long-term, but it was about all that a Chief Executive could do in 
the short-term.  In the private sector, his major initiative was a fundamental 
improvement in America’s transportation infrastructure.  In 1956, Eisenhower 




linked to national security.  His personal experience with America’s poor highways 
in 1919 gave him ample reason to press hard for a federal investment in 
transportation efficiency that was more consistent with a liberal, New Deal 
ideology than with a Republican perspective on political economy.572     
 More consistently conservative was his effort to rein in the agricultural 
subsidy program.  From his perspective all that he was doing was bringing 
agricultural policy into line with the changes that had taken place in this sector of 
the economy during the years since the Great Depression.  Agriculture from the 
late 1930s through WWII and into the 1950s had experienced revolutionary 
changes in productivity and organization.  Innovations in breeding and 
mechanization were matched by economies of scale in corporate farming.573  Still, 
the political pressure to preserve the subsidy system created under the New Deal 
was intense, and after eight years of struggle, the expenditures on control were just 
as high as they had been in 1953.  The interest groups and their friends in Congress 
won this fight – the worst defeat of Ike’s eight years in office.574      
 What was missing from Eisenhower’s initial approach to the economy was 
an aggressive effort to promote in business the kinds of innovations that were – 
with substantial, long-established, local-state-federal support – transforming 
agriculture.  With regard to business, the central assumption of the first 




private initiatives would take hold and produce the innovations that would prove 
the “stagnationists” wrong about America’s economic future.  To some 
considerable extent, Eisenhower and his closest advisors were still deeply invested 
in and interested in the great firms that had given the United States a leading edge 
in the second industrial revolution.  One of the leading symbols of this mindset was 
Secretary of Defense “Engine” Charlie Wilson of General Motors.  Wilson 
famously elided the differences between GM and the national economy:  “what 
was good for our country” he proclaimed, “was good for General Motors, and vice 
versa.”575    
 For the most part, Eisenhower initially agreed with this simple formulation.  
While the administration’s budgets included support for basic research at the 
National Science Foundation, agricultural research, the National Institutes of 
Health, and government purchases of advanced equipment (including, in particular, 
computers), the Eisenhower concept of political economy was at first more passive 
than active.576  There were of course “spill-overs” from the national security 
program.577  Government purchases had for some years been an important form of 
support to the computer industry.578  But this was not a planned program to 
encourage innovation.  Eisenhower’s strategy assumed that once the government 
had balanced the budget and had begun to create a business-friendly environment, 




American growth.  In 1954, Ike carefully analyzed the economic problems 
confronting him:  they ranged from the farm problem and public power to drought 
and disaster relief.  The need to promote innovation through scientific and 
technological advances was not on the list.579  The President meant what he said 
when he looked to “the free play of our people’s genius for individual initiative.” 
 Then, strangely, inadvertently, miraculously, it actually happened.  The 
geniuses were many and for some years they worked far away from the media’s 
gaze.  But the wellspring of America’s third industrial revolution had already 
begun to flow in 1947 when Eisenhower was Army Chief of Staff.  Contrary to 
economic logic and common sense, the foundational innovation came from a giant, 
pervasively regulated, heavily bureaucratized corporation.  The Bell System’s 
discovery, the transistor, had quickly acquired a national and international 
reputation.  But the transistor was only popular among those firms, individuals, and 
government organizations that had something very specific to gain from a new 
type of electronic switching device.  AT&T made the invention available through 
reasonable licensing contracts, and by the mid-1950s the dynamics of the third 
industrial revolution, the digital revolution, were taking hold in the United States.  
At Fairchild Semiconductor and a few other firms, the transistor evolved into the 
integrated circuit and laid the technological base for what would shortly become 




“genius for individual initiative” than even Ike could have wished for in early 
1953.581    
The Eisenhower administration’s role in this stunning economic transition 
remained unchanged until the Soviet Union sent Sputnik into orbit in 1957.  
Congress, the media, the public, and America’s allies were all shocked by the 
Soviet accomplishment.582  The United States had long been protected by the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, but now those natural barriers seemed less formidable 
and isolation a dwindling option.  Eisenhower remained calm.  He was confident 
that the Soviet satellite was not a threat to America’s national security.  But he 
decided that his administration had to take a more positive and visible position on 
scientific and technical change and had to do that quickly.583   
Changes came tumbling out of the White House.584  Ike spoke to the nation 
on “Science in National Security” and announced that he had appointed a new 
advisor, Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., of M.I.T., as his special assistant on science and 
technology.  New appropriations followed.  One created the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (ARPA, 1958, later, the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency, DARPA), a defense organization whose mission included the promotion 
of public-private innovations that would strengthen America’s leadership in high 
technology.585  The administration was, in effect, laying the foundation for the 




internet and support other innovations in digital technology.586  It would be some 
years before the innovations in electronics would begin to have a major impact on 
the national economy, but by 1960 it was already evident that America’s private 
sector was not about to become stagnant. 
What, then, was Eisenhower’s record on economic growth?  The aggregates 
are impressive without being overwhelming.  The average annual growth rate of 
real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over the eight years that he was President was 
about two and a half percent.  The economy was keeping ahead of an expanding 
population.  GDP per capita increased, as did the work force, which grew from 63 
to almost 70 million workers.  Women had been joining the work force in 
increasing numbers since World War II and that important trend continued.  The 
number of female workers went up by 3.8 million during Ike’s eight years in 
office.  Private investment was up by 39%, and this all took place while the 
inflation rate was held to an average of about 1.4%.  There was no appreciable 
change in income distribution, so the major gains in equality that Americans had  
realized  during World War II were sustained.   
We do not have figures on the rate of increase in start-up firms, but we do 
know that a series of successful and important new businesses got going during 
these years.  Most impressive was Fairchild Semiconductor, in part because it was 




firms organized during the Eisenhower administrations included Thermo Electron 
(today Thermo Fisher Scientific), Semtech, and Tyco International.587  By the end 
of the 1950s, America had a set of private and public institutions that would enable 
it to lead the world into the next phase of the digital revolution.  Ike’s confidence 
in the “people’s genius” was amply rewarded. 
Along the way to this conclusion, not all of the economic news was 
favorable.  Capitalism is a restless system, and Eisenhower had to contend with the 
three recessions we mentioned before.  The cyclical downturns in 1953-54, 1957-
58, and 1960-61 all inspired intense fear that the economy might be sagging back 
into a major depression.  The memory of the 1930s had not yet been erased from 
the minds of most Americans of working age, including President Eisenhower.588  
Two of the recessions were, however, relatively mild:  the unemployment rates 
peaked at slightly over 6% in 1954 and 6.8% in 1960.  More serious was the 1957-
58 recession, which pushed unemployment to a peak of 7.6%.  In all three cases, 
the combination of Federal Reserve monetary policy, automatic stabilizers, and the 
administration’s fiscal policy worked to cut off potential downward spirals.589  On 
average, unemployment hovered around 5% for the entire eight years of the 
administration.  It was a thoroughly “Middle-Way” style of capitalism.         
 Less successful was Eisenhower’s encounter with foreign trade.  Here, he 




creative role competition played in fostering economic progress.  Paradoxically, 
however, problems arose because of the success the United States was achieving in 
stabilizing the free-world economy and encouraging economic recovery following 
WWII.  Japan was enjoying a surge of economic development supported by the 
United States.  President Eisenhower continued that support through both of his 
administrations.  For reasons linked to Cold War national security, Ike saw Japan 
as the United States’ bulwark in the Pacific, just as Germany was an essential ally 
in Europe.  When, however, Japanese exports to the United States shot up, he 
found it necessary to negotiate a series of “voluntary export restraints” with Japan.  
These agreements temporarily relieved the pressure on particular American firms.  
But they were not a solution to America’s encounter with fierce global competition 
and were inconsistent with Eisenhower’s emphasis on the long perspective in 
economic policy.590  He left that problem in the lap of the next president. 
  
Realities of Economic Security and Equity              
 To Eisenhower, there was no serious conflict between policies that 
supported economic growth, innovation, and efficiency and those that provided 
Americans with greater security and an enhanced sense of equity.  He was not 
concerned about the high taxes paid by upper-income groups even though they 




important to him than reducing the taxes paid by wealthy individuals and large 
corporations.  “It would be most unfair,” he explained in 1953, “to grant tax relief 
to one group when we cannot yet afford to grant it to all.”591  Insofar as the 
Eisenhower and Federal Reserve blend of fiscal and monetary policies held down 
inflation, they provided a greater measure of security to all those citizens with 
fixed incomes. 
 Many Americans were attempting to live on their monthly social security 
payments, and Eisenhower understood how difficult that could be.  His brother Ed 
was far to the right of the Middle Way.  Ed resented entitlements and attacked the 
entire social-welfare system as a government give-away that should be curtailed.  
Still attempting to be the dominant older brother, Ed was full of suggestions about 
everything from defending the Constitution to making Supreme Court 
appointments.  Ike – certain that he and not Ed had been elected President – was at 
first patient with his obstreperous older brother.592  But in November 1954 Ike 
finally exploded:  “the Federal government cannot avoid or escape 
responsibilities,” he wrote to Ed, “which the mass of the people firmly believe 
should be undertaken by it.  The political processes of our country are such that if a 
rule of reason is not applied in this effort, we will lose everything—even to a 
possible and drastic change in the Constitution.  This is what I mean by my 




attempt to abolish social security, unemployment insurance, and eliminate labor 
laws and farm programs, you would not hear of that party again in our political 
history.”593  As if to add a final forceful period to that verbal blast, the President 
supported another expansion of the Social Security System and was able to sign the 
measure in August 1956.594     
Throughout his two administrations, Eisenhower backed a variety of new 
programs where he could see a real need for federal action.  That continued to be 
more important to him than an abstract principle about getting the federal 
government out of activities that should be left to the states.  He worked hard to 
reduce federal involvement where he thought it was unwarranted, but he added to 
the government’s responsibilities when he was certain it would serve the national 
interest.  Fending off the right wing of the Republican Party and suppressing his 
own constitutional misgivings, he promoted increased federal involvement in 
education and the construction of a massive federal road system.  He sold the road 
system to the public on national security grounds.595  Eisenhower also made no 
effort to change the Congressional policy of using the surplus in social security to 
fund other programs.    
Eisenhower gave substantial consideration to providing Americans with 
equality of opportunity.  He never mistook that for equality of outcomes.  He was 




communist leaders frequently touted as an advantage of the socialist system.  But 
where opportunity was concerned, he moved quickly and forcefully to establish his 
position.  Convinced that education played a powerful role in opening the way to 
jobs and promotions for Americans, Ike was willing to use the federal 
government’s resources to promote school construction in kindergarten through 
12th grade education.596   
Ike understood that African Americans were blocked from the education 
they deserved and the job opportunities they needed.  In 1954, the Supreme Court 
overturned the state laws that had kept African American and white children in 
separate and distinctly unequal schools.597  That, for Eisenhower, was now the law 
of the land.  While privately he would have preferred a more moderate step 
forward, he did not question his responsibility for enforcing the law.  He tried to 
establish racial equality where he had the authority to act.  In matters of civil 
rights, Ike was something of a convert.  During his long career in the military from 
1915 through D-Day, he had never officially or informally complained about 
policies on racial segregation in the Army.  In the latter stages of the war in 
Europe, however, he had insisted that African-American soldiers should be 
allowed to volunteer for combat duty.598  In this limited case, he had been 




In 1953, however, he moved quickly and forcefully to open opportunities for 
African Americans:  he eliminated segregation in Washington, DC, and pushed 
forward with the desegregation of the military – a policy that President Truman 
had begun in 1948.599  Seeking a more decisive change, he worked closely with 
Democratic leader Lyndon Johnson to push through Congress the first civil rights 
act of the 20th century.  Fierce Dixiecrat opposition prevented the passage of a truly 
formidable measure.  So the Civil Rights Act of 1957 fell short of what was needed 
to protect African American voting rights and opportunities for education and 
employment.  But it broke ground for the later, more powerful measures and was a 
step toward federal support for the development of a society that eventually might 
not discriminate against people of color.600   
In 1957, when Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas challenged federal 
authority by employing the state’s National Guard to block court-ordered 
integration of the high school in Little Rock, Eisenhower moved decisively to 
defend federal authority.  He tried first to avoid a confrontation that he knew 
Faubus could not win.  But when discussion failed, the President ordered a stop to 
the obstruction of justice, federalized the state’s National Guard, and sent troops 
from the 101st Airborne Division to enforce with success the court order.  For 
Eisenhower, this struggle had at least three major dimensions:  he was concerned 




direct, senseless challenge to a federal court; and he was now and would remain 
deeply concerned about equality of opportunity through education.601     
 
Eisenhower’s Style of Prosperity 
 When Eisenhower turned over the White House to President John Fitzgerald 
Kennedy in January 1961, he gave the new Democratic Administration an 
American economy that was in better shape than the one Ike had received from 
Truman in 1953.  The economy was well attuned to the Middle Way philosophy of 
government.  The budget had been balanced in 1960, and the recession of 1960-
1961 was relatively mild.  With recovery, the economy would be positioned for 
another surge of growth and more advances in the new digital technology.  That 
would not satisfy President Kennedy, Vice-President Johnson or their economic 
advisors, who would seek to close the gap that they saw between the economy’s 
potential and its performance.  
 Eisenhower and his team, however, would leave office satisfied that they 
had achieved most of their long-term goals in the realm of political economy.  In 
his last economic report to the Congress on January 20, 1960, President 
Eisenhower described an economy that had achieved record-breaking levels of 




actions,” he thought the United States would be able to maintain a low rate of 
inflation and still have “the basis for a high, continuing rate of growth.”602   
Above all, Ike and his team had given the nation an economy that was suited 
to a Cold War that was likely to last longer than any of them would be alive.  He 
had recognized from the beginning of his first administration that America’s 
economic strength would be crucial to an ultimate victory in the struggle against 
communism.  Over his eight years in office, he had never lost sight of that goal.     
In 1956, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had threatened to bury the United 
States and its allies as the communist economies surged ahead.  By 1961, 
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